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INTRODUCTION
T IS TIME to take exception to the indictment that psychiatry
is undermining individual responsibility and subverting the crim-
inal law process.' The charge should more appropriately recite that
those persons who are longing for certainties and freedom from indi-
vidual responsibility are abdicating and casting the responsibility for
decision-making to psychiatrists.
The "psychiatrization" of the criminal-law test of responsibility
is regarded by critics as a prime illustration of the alleged debilitating
effect of psychiatry. Professor Jerome Hall, among others, says that
the campaign by psychiatry has been relentless to destroy the
McNaghten "right and wrong" rule of criminal responsibility (which
somehow or other is tied in with the concept of individual responsi-
bility).2 Professor Hall tells us that "the propagandists now agitate
for the abolition of all legal tests," and he exclaims that "the propa-
gandists of the new conception of man are organized and endowed
with vast sums of money taken from the pockets of unorganized
citizens who are helpless to check the onslaught."
LL.B., M.A., Tulane University. Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University.
The author wishes to thank Drs. Frank Silva, John Trice and Gene Usdin for helpful
discussions. The author, however, takes sole responsibility for the views expressed.
' A recent jeremiad which has received considerable attention is sociologist
Richard LaPiere's THE FREUDIAN ETHIC (1959), subtitled AN ANALYSIS OF THE Sua-
VERSION OF AMERICAN CHARACTER. See further SCHOECK & WIGGINS, PSYCHIATRY AND
RESONSIBILITY (1962). Psychiatry is also called a threat to civil liberties. Szasz,
Psychiatry's Threat to Civil Liberties, National Review, Mar. 12, 1963, p. 191. The
various and sundry criticisms directed against psychiatry are collected in Miller &
Halleck, The Critics of Psychiatry: A Review of Contemporary Critical Attitudes, 119
Am. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 705 (1963).
2 Professor Hall's observations quoted herein are from his article The Psychiatrist
and Crime: A Threat to Society?, National Observer, Aug. 20, 1962. Professor Hall
supports the McNaghten rule in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 500-18 (2d ed.
1960); Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956); and Responsi-
bility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
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INSANITY AT TIME OF OFFENSE
Our system of jurisprudence for a long time has maintained that
an individual should not be held responsible for his actions when
he does not know what he is doing or when he is "sick." The
difficulty has been in applying this general principle. Jurists, psychi-
atrists and others have spent countless hours trying to formulate a
rule that will determine when a man is sufficiently demented to be
no longer held accountable for what he does. The formulation of
the rule theoretically determines the function of the court, the
function of the jury, the instructions, and the scope of the evidence.
The case in 1843 of Daniel McNaghten has been told ad nauseam,
but we restate it for the sake of clarity. McNaghten, a paranoid
schizophrenic, heard God telling him that Sir Robert Peel, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain, was not really Sir Robert Peel but the
devil in the flesh, and if he would destroy Peel, all Europe would
accolade him as a savior. McNaghten stationed himself outside
Peel's house and shot the first man with a high hat, who turned out to
be Edward Drummond, the private secretary of the Prime Minister.
McNaghten then got up on the steps and demanded the passersby
to bow down before him. "I have," he cried out, "rid Europe of a
monster." He was tried and acquitted. It was obvious, in popular
parlance, that he was crazy. The acquittal, however, was the be-
ginning rather than the end of this celebrated case.3
The House of Lords, exercising its special constitutional right,
consulted the judges upon the law relating to insanity. The judges'
answer, known as the McNaghten rule, was put in the following
terms:
The jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible
-'The story has its variations. "[McNaghten, a paranoiac,] suffered from delusions
of persecution as a result of which he had visited various countries in an attempt to
escape from his persecutors. His complaints to his parents and to public authorities
were unavailing, and he became embittered. So, with the object of drawing attention
to his case and of righting his supposed wrongs, he devised a plan to kill Sir Robert
Peel. He kept a watch on his house, and when he saw a man come out, he shot Mr.
Drummond under the mistaken belief that he was shooting Sir Robert Peel .... [The
defense's] plea [of partial insanity] was upheld and McNaghten was certified as of
unsound mind and detained in a lunatic asylum. The verdict in the above case
created a great sensation and much controversy ensued. A few days after the trial
the case was debated in the House of Lords .... " HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, PSYClATRY
549 (9th ed. 1962).
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for his crimes, until the contrary can be proved to their satisfaction; and
that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved, that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Thus, under the McNaghten rule, crime is excused when the indi-
vidual is so mad as not to know the difference between right and
wrong. Defect of cognition as a consequence of mental disease is
the primary exculpating factor under the rule.
It is often stated that "Western civilization rests on the premise
that normal adults are rational and therefore have a very significant
sphere of freedom and autonomy."4 The McNaghten test is a child
of the Age of Reason, but even earlier, Aristotle postulated that the
essence of man is rationality. The dictum, "Cogito, ergo sum," "I
think, therefore I am," is, however, the formula for the schizoid
intellectual's struggle to possess an ego. A healthy human being
would be more likely to start from "I feel, therefore I am." The
McNaghten rule does not do justice to the emotional and irrational
aspects of human personality, and these are too important to be
overlooked.5 Psychiatrists do not speak with one voice but at least
show certain areas of agreement; they point out the profound in-
fluence upon our everyday behavior of thoughts and feelings of which
we are usually unconscious, and they stress the importance of events
in the first five years of life in shaping those aspects of our adult
personalities of which we tend to be least aware. Intelligence, they
' Hall, The Psychiatrist and Crime: A Threat to Society?, National Observer, Aug.
20, 1962.
5 The desideratum, an amalgamation of thought and feeling, is expressed in
Norman Brown's LiFE AGAINsr DEATH (1959) and Herbert Marcuse's ERos AND CWLIZA-
nON (1955) as "Dionysian Ego" or "libidinal rationality," a goal which unfortunately
has been misconstrued as anti-intellectualism, anti-rationalism, beatnikism. See Roszak,
The Historian as Psychiatrist, The Nation, Nov. 24, 1962, p. 343.
A considerable number of American intellectuals today are opposed to liberalism
and tolerance. Overreacting to the bondage of the past, they present a kind of anti-
intellectual intellectualism which is pure "no-nothingism." Letter from Paul Peters,
a former editor of Life and now editor of Image, to the author, March 22, 1963. There
is a vital difference, it seems to be forgotten, between thought and action. It is
possible, believe it or not, to be just to a hated man. To say that one ought to ventilate
hate by spitting in another's eye, to put thought into action, is a gross distortion
of Freud. According to Freud, there is value in becoming conscious of the reasons
for hate; the feelings may then be handled effectively and constructively. The Age
of Reason, it seems, is still in the future.
Vol. 1963: 395]
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point out, is not to be equated with mental health.6 Mental institu-
tions have their quota of Ph.D.'s. Consider, for example, the
notorious case of Bill Heirens, a brilliant college student, who
butchered a little girl and threw her dismembered limbs into a sewer,
and who wrote on the wall of one victim's apartment, "For God's
sake, catch me before I do this again." Consider also the case of the
birdman, now idolized in film. Even though of superior intelligence,
he shot a man over a prostitute for whom he was pimping, attacked
an orderly and tried to stab him to death, and assaulted a mentally
retarded boy.
The McNaghten "knowledge of right and wrong" test of criminal
responsibility continues to be the law of most American states and
federal jurisdictions. The McNaghten test is intellectualistic and
moralistic, not medical.7 Medical madness is not McNaghten mad-
ness.8 In testifying under the rule, literally and strictly applied, a
psychiatrist is out of bounds in presenting evidence of the individual's
mental status or capacity to control conduct. The evidence would
not be responsive to the issue.
The truth of the matter, however, is that the McNaghten rule,
'The mental defective has less intellect to deal with the ordinary things in life,
hence they are apt to appear more dangerous and devastating to him. As Winnicott
puts it:
Where there is restricted intellectual capacity (based on poor brain-tissue en-
dowment) the infant's capacity to convert not-quite-good-enough environmental
adaptation into good-enough environmental adaptation is lowered, with the result
that certain psychoses are more common in defectives than in the normal popula-
tion. Exceptional brain-tissue endowment may enable an infant to allow for a
severe failure of adaptation to need, but in such a case there can be a prostitution
of mental activity so that one finds clinically a hypertrophy of intellectual
processes related to a potential schizophrenic breakdown. WINNICOTr, COLLECTED
PAPERS 225 (1958).
Yet intelligence does not give immunity against mental disorder. The paranoid person-
ality, for example, is so often not lacking in intelligence. Also, as student counsellors can
readily attest, the super-I.Q. students contribute their share of disciplinary problems
at school; they are often cold and isolated individuals, lacking in interpersonal rela-
tions. In recovery, the intelligent person generally has an advantage over the sub-
normal inasmuch as intelligence is ego binding.
I Mental abnormality is variously defined for different purposes. For the purposes
of psychiatry, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL ON MENTAL DISORDERS. For the purposes of the law, the definition of mental
illness is different. Hence, it is incumbent upon the legislature to be explicit about
the meaning of "mental disease" when used in various legal contexts, as for example
civil commitment, testamentary capacity, traumatic neurosis, criminal responsibility.
See Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative
Action, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 389 (1963).
O See Brain, The Languages of Psychiatry, 109 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 4 (1963). It
is interesting to observe that the determination of insanity is somewhat tautological:
a normal person would not commit an abnormal act; he did it, so he must be ab-
normal. The evaluation is circular, but pragmatic. Legal insanity tends increasingly
[Vol. 1963: 395
while given lip service, has long been dead.9 It is generally ac-
knowledged that the rule has been interpreted liberally, admitting
psychiatric testimony without limit.10 Thus applied, the rule has
survived the years. If the rule were applied otherwise, extremely
few individuals would ever be found legally insane. Indeed, there
to be diagnosed only by the offender's inability to accommodate himself to the
demands of the society.
Adherence today to the old McNaghten rule of 1843, which has now reached the
age of six score years, may be taken to signify any of the following:
(1) Psychiatry or law has not progressed during the past 120 years. Dr. Franklin
G. Ebaugh and Dr. John M. Macdonald, Denver psychiatrists, contend that the law
covering insanity in criminal cases is "so archaic that it is dangerous." Ebaugh & Mac-
donald, The Medicolegal Dilemma-An Interment of Truth, 184 J.A.M.A. 131 (1963).
(2) No change or improvement is needed in the law.
(3) The McNaghten rule as formulated is a dead horse and is only given lip
service.
(4) Criminal responsibility under the McNaghten rule involves a moral issue,
and psychiatrists have no special competence in that province.
It is appropriate to note here the contention that the court should abandon the
McNaghten rule and adopt a rule excusing from crime the act of a defendant which
is the product of mental disease or defect but leaving the exact definition of "in-
sanity" to the jury, just as in the law of tort where the definition of "reasonable man"
is left to the jury based upon its experience and common sense. Critics of the
McNaghten rule argue that the writing into law of a rule based on a legal under-
standing of medical knowledge existing at the time of the establishment of the rule
is subject to inevitable and eventual difficulty. Because of the doctrine of stare decisis,
a definition in a rule of law will not be able to conform to changes in science and
human understanding. Hence, it is argued, the McNaghten rule ought to be discarded,
replacing it by Durham or Currens (discussed infra), where the matter is substantially
left to the decision of the jury upon the broadest possible base of medical and lay
testimony. It is, however, an error to assume that the McNaghten test sets out a
medical definition. To repeat, McNaghten madness is not medical madness. Hence
developments in medical science do not outmode the legal definition. On the othes
hand, a moral definition, which McNaghten sets out, is not so readily dated by the
doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, one might say that this danger can more readily
occur under the Durham or Currens tests. It is perhaps inevitable that these tests
will be (and are) administered so as to make "mental disease or defect" a jural rather
than a psychiatric definition.
10 Charles E. Clark, U.S. Circuit Judge and former dean of the Yale Law School,
says: "This test is sufficiently vague that sympathetic judges and juries, if so minded,
can show mercy to the mentally diseased under indictment." Clark, Book Review, The
Nation, Jan. 12, 1963, p. 36. In Judge Cardozo's words, the McNaghten rule refers
to the "true capacity of the individual." Cardozo, The Psychiatry of Criminal Guilt,
in CAHN, SOCIAL MEANING OF LFGAL CoNCEMrs (1960). More and more, McNaghten
madness appears to be equated with medical madness.
The situation in England and Scotland is apparently the same. See MAYER-GRoss,
SLATR & ROTH, CANICAL PSYCHIATRY 611 (2d ed. 1960); YELLOWLES, To DEFINE TirE
MADNESS 146 (rev. ed. 1955).
One might compare the McNaghten situation with the law and practice relating
to the procuring of abortion. The solution generally has been to lay down the
simple, general law that it is illegal to procure abortion, and to leave it to be under-
stood that nothing will be said if medical men of standing procure abortion for bona
fide therapeutic purposes, after due consideration and without improper secrecy.
YELLOWLEES, op. cit. supra at 146.
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is hardly a patient in a mental hospital who does not know the
difference between right and wrong. Strict adherence to the rule
and a strict construction of it would send just about all persons
who commit a criminal act to prison."
In 1954 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the
Durham case' 2 decided no longer to give lip service to the fiction de-
veloped under the McNaghten rule. It decided to call a spade a
spade. The Durham rule of insanity is that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was a product of mental
disease or mental defect."' 3 While this is how the McNaghten rule
has generally been interpreted in practice, the Durham rule without
subterfuge gives psychiatrists free range to testify. It expressly
brings into trial all the medical facts in medical terms. The
Durham decision expressly states that the purpose of the rule is to
get good psychiatric testimony, all of the psychiatric testimony. By
dropping the notion of responsibility based upon cognition in favor
of capacity or controllability, the court sought to clarify the prevail-
ing practice, to bring it out into the open, and to allow testimony
without the "straight jacket of the law." Judge Bazelon, the author
of the opinion, knew what he was about, but a new formulation of
""Lord Brougham observed, "Nobody is hardly ever really mad enough to be within
the definition of madness laid down in the [McNaghten rule]." Quoted in HENDERSON
& Gir-.arSP,. SYCHiATRY 551 (9th ed. 1962). In a literal application of the McNaghtcn
rule, two (and probably only two) classes of law-breakers would be exempted from
punishment. For example, in the case of homicide: (a) the person thought that the
gun with which he shot somebody was not a deadly weapon but a water pistol, and
was therefore unaware of the fact that it would kill (he did not "know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing"); or (b) the person labored under the delusion
that he was physically attacked and acted in legitimate self-defense ("he did not know
he was doing what was wrong"). The McNaghten rule, by the way, does not ask
whether the law-breaker knew the difference between right and wrong. It asks whether
he "knew he was doing what was wrong" or, perhaps, thought he was doing what was
right; that is, whether he was under a delusion to act in legitimate self-defense.
On the other hand, a paranoiac with delusional ideas to the effect that someone
is destroying his social position by spreading vicious rumors about him (e.g., that he is
a homosexual) would not be exempt from punishment because, if the content of his
delusional ideas were true, he still would not have the right to kill his pursuer but
would have to seek redress in some other way. This is spelled out in the second
McNaghten rule which stipulates with reference to what it calls "partial delusions"
that the law-breaker "must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as
if the act in respect to which the delusion exists were real." That is, it must be
asked whether a person would be liable to punishment if it were true that his victim
had spread vicious rumors about him but he would not be liable to punishment if
it were true that he defended his life.
12Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Is Id. at 87. See also Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of
the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905 (1961).
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a rule in new language brings new difficulties in interpretation in its
wake. Judges and juries in subsequent cases have been mired in
confusion over the terms "disease," "defect" and "product." The
test "product of a mental disease or mental defect" does not guide
the jury, for example, as to the degree of mental disease or defect.
In psychiatric nomenclature the term "mental illness" includes
psychosis (major mental illness) and neurosis, but the term in the
Durham rule has been construed to include the personality disorders,
the "psychopathic and sociopathic personalities" (antisocial indi-
viduals).' 4 Judge Holtzoff remarked, "It is not inconceivable that
14 See Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Briscoe v. United
States, 248 F.2d 640, 643-44 8- n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The concept and definition of the
psychopathic or anti-social personality has not been dearly handled in the law, or it
has been distorted under the legal definition of insanity. The psychopathic personality,
commonly called sociopath, falls among the personality disorders. He differs from
the psychoneurotic or psychotic, and indeed contrasts with them in the most im-
portant characteristics, yet some courts form the impression that the psychopathic
personality suffers from mental illness. The etiology of the words "pathology of the
psyche" is misleading. The old term "moral insanity" is a better description. The
psychopathic personality is not so much a disorder as it is a defect, a failure of
development.
To give an analogy, which I owe to Dr. Cyril Phillips, dwarf orange trees, grown
by a special technique to be a few inches high at maturity cannot be said to be sick
or diseased trees. They are clearly distinguishable from full-size ones in a grove which
have become infected. It is also clear when such a dwarf tree is healthy, or infected
or diseased. In the same way it is possible to consider a psychopathic personality as
a dwarf tree, with limited function, e.g., ornament, fundamentally unalterable and
free from disease. Leaving the analogy at this point, it is theoretically possible to
change a psychopathic personality by the prolonged application of a high degree of
skill such as we may hope to find among psychoanalysts with a special preference for
this work or in the highest grade institutions. At present this can only be achieved
as a "laboratory" experiment.
The symptoms of a delinquent provide pleasure in contrast to the symptoms of
a neurotic or psychotic which yield displeasure. The psychotic may waste his energy
in hallucination; the neurotic, driven by phobias, may withdraw to his room-not the
delinquent. He acts out; he makes life miserable for others. He is unwilling or unable
to give preference to value enforcement over immediate gratification. He "smiles and
sucks," and if this fails, he "bites and runs." The delinquent does not suffer unless
he is caught and fears punishment. He laughs at the psychiatrist. He is not in
distress, a sine qua non for effective treatment. He is markedly lacking in ability
to observe himself. Eissler, Some Problems of Delinquency, SEAnCHLIGHTS ON DE-
LINQUENCY 3 (Eissler ed. 1949).
Hervey Cleckley, in his book THE MAsK OF SANITY (1941), lists the characteristic
points distinguishing the psychopath as follows: (1) superficial charm and good
"intelligence" (which makes it dear that his behavior cannot be explained on the
basis of mental deficiency); (2) absence of delusions and other signs of irrational
"thinking" (thus this excludes psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia); (3) absence
of "nervousness" or psychoneurotic manifestions; (4) unreliability; (5) untruthfulness
and insincerity; (6) lack of remorse and shame; (7) inadequately motivated antisocial
behavior; (8) poor judgment and failure to learn by experience; (9) pathologic ego-
centricity and incapacity for love; (10) general poverty in major affective reactions;
(11) specific loss of insight; (12) unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations;
Vol. 1963: 595][
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perhaps the so-called Durham formula would not have been
adopted if it had been foreseen at the time that it would lead to the
exculpation of sociopaths or psychopaths from criminal liability.' u
Disillusioned by both the McNaghten rule and the Durham rule,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Currens case'0
came up with a formula drawn in part from a test proposed by the
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code. The test set out
in the Currens case is that criminal responsibility will be imposed
upon the accused where he was not suffering from a disease of the
mind, or, even though suffering from such mental disease, where he
possessed "substantial capacity" to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law at the time of the criminal act.' 7
The Currens test will probably have a fate no better than
Durham, for a formula should pay some respect to empiricism. Ex-
cept in the unusual case where a person is directed by hallucination
to commit a crime, it would be well-nigh impossible to determine
whether the diseased or healthy part of the individual's mind led
(13) fantastic and uninviting behavior, with drink and sometimes without; (14)
suicide rarely carried out; (15) sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated; and
(16) faiure to follow any life plan. See also Jenkins, The Psychopathic or Antisocial
Personality, 131 J. OF NERvouS AND MENTAL DISEASE 318 (1960).
15 O'Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 660 (1961). Guttmacher, The Psychia-
trist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. C.HL L. REV. 325 (1955), predicted that Durham would
not be easy to administer. The problems of Durham in the District of Columbia are
described in Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
1' United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
27See Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 189
(1962).
The rulings by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of criminal responsi-
bility are both old and oblique. See Matheson v. United Sfates, 227 U.S. 540 (1913);
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), 165 U.S. 373 (1897). There is a vast amount
of literature and cases on the subject, but courts, attorneys, law professors and psychia-
trists remain divided on the best approach. See TOMPKINs, INSANITY AND TIlE CRIMINAL
LAw: A BIBLIOGRAPHY, Bureau of Pub. Ad., U. Calif., June, 1960. It is therefore a bit
of wisdom on the part of the Supreme Court not to freeze the stewing by a grant of
certiorari. In the Currens case Judge Biggs states:
We think that perhaps the Supreme Court has withheld the granting of
certiorari in such cases as Sauer v. United States, [241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957)], and has not laid down a rule for the federal courts
in respect to criminal responsibilty of the mentally ill because it desires to treat
the circuits as it does the States, as laboratories for the development of sub-
stantive law. 290 F.2d at 769.
The following circuits have recently declined to revise the existing rule: Beltran
v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962); Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108
(10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Westerhausen, 283 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1960); Voss v.
United States, 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958); Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1956); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956) (abrogation
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him to his crime.'8 A person can have a "touch" of schizophrenia,
unlike the possibility of having a "touch" of pregnancy, which is an
all-or-none situation. In addition, and most important, a test must
be fairly cleancut and reasonably simple."9 The test, after all, is
going to be applied by a jury of laymen, twelve ordinary men. The
Currens test is too complex for use in the court room, or anywhere
else for that matter. There are few lawyers, much less laymen, who
understand it.
The Durham decision, initially supported by many, and the
Currens decision are faced each year with a growing negative re-
action. Perhaps a spade ought not to have been called a spade.
While we may generally endorse the abandonment of disguise, we
ought however to pay attention to the words of Oscar Wilde: "A
man who calls a spade a spade is fit only to use one." There is no
desire here to advocate one rule of criminal responsibility over
another, or to prate about the difference, if any in actual operation,
between the rules. Indeed, the McNaghten rule, urged by Professor
Hall and others, has advantages not provided by the other rules. The
jury has an easier task with the McNaghten rule, narrowly or broadly
applied, than with the other rules, and that is highly important for
the fair administration of justice.20
Some say that the crucial issue is whether the courts should de-
termine the test for responsibility and have medical witnesses direct
their testimony to that test, or whether the medical profession itself
should determine legal responsibility. This formulation of the
issue, however, does not put the matter in proper focus.
of McNaghten was argued before the Fifth Circuit en banc in Carter v. United States,
May 28, 1963).
For a listing of states which follow each specific rule, see Note, 15 VAND. L. REV.
274, 276 n.18 (1962).
18 Slovenko 8& Super, The Mentally Disabled, The Law, and The Report of the
American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. REv. 1366, 1383 (1961). Furthermore, the mean-
ing of "substantial" is different for each person. One may contend that the jury
decision affords an adequate amalgamation of opinion, in other words, a hodge-podge
answer coming out in a "yes" or "no" verdict.
2' Indeed, defense counsel have quite enough to do in preparing a defense that the
defendant was not involved in the commission of the act. At the trial stage of the
proceeding, defense counsel is overwhelmed by exploration of anything else. In a
recent reaffirmance of the McNaghten rule, the Washintgon Supreme Court observed
that any other rule would be difficult to apply. State v. White, 374 P.2d 942 (Wash.
1962).
20 Jurors do not understand the McNaghten test, much less the Durham or Currens
tests. On the basis of informal studies, it appears that jurors decide wtihout con-
sidering the test, but the tendency is to acquit because jurors consider it unfair to
Vol. 1963: 395]
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First, why have a formula at all? The juvenile court (while
perhaps subject to criticism on other grounds) gets along quite well
without one. What is the value of a formula of irresponsibility?
To allow liberty to persons proven dangerous? To send incurables
and uncontrollables to the hospital? To allow them to disrupt the
hospital society as they have disrupted the community from which
they came? To sidetrack witnesses, judge and jury into moral and
theoretical questions which are impossible to answer? The law is
obsessive-compulsive by nature; it, of all disciplines, notably puts
things in brackets, yet we must remember, as Humpty Dumpty
cautioned, never to let words or brackets be the master. Guttmacher
and Weihofen put it this way:
Fundamentally, why should it make any difference whether a person who
has committed a criminal act was sane at the time and therefore guilty,
or not guilty by reason of insanity? In either case he has shown himself
a menace to society who must be taken into custody and control. Why
worry over whether that control is based on criminality or insanity?2t
A motorist has a heart attack or an epileptic fit and hits a pedes-
trian; a man squeezes his wife's throat thinking that he is squeezing a
lemon; a man shoots a policeman thinking he is the devil; a woman,
concretely interpreting the scripture that one knows God only by
drinking the blood and eating the flesh, cooks and eats her newborn
child. These persons are all responsible for their acts. Who else, if
they are not? As the Eichmann trial may remind us, everyone must
convict when they do not understand the instructions. One judge observed, "In
criminal cases after three days of trial they [the jury] usually evaluate the prisoner and
determine whether or not he is a crook and should be placed in jail or honest and
should be released. That is about it." Symposium: The Law and Psychiatry, 109
J. OF LA. STATE MED. Soc. 141, 157 (1957).
One difficulty with the McNaghten rule arises in the charge to the jury. As
pointed out, courts usually under the McNaghten rule allow all psychiatric evidence
to be admitted at the trial but, through the charge, confuse the jury by instructing
it not to consider any except that evidence which relates to cognition. The confusion
resulting in t.1e minds of the jurors as a result of the divergence between the evidence
presented and the McNaghten charge might, however, be used to justify a literal,
strict application of the MeNaghten rule, keeping psychiatric testimony entirely out
of the trial stage of the proceeding.
21 GUTIACHER & ,VEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 443 (1952). Similar views
have been expressed by other writers. See EvEREST, DEFENCE OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL
CASES (1887); MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 29 (1958); Baur, Legal Re-
sponsibility and Mental Illness, 57 Nw. U. L. Rav. 12 (1962); Scher, Expertise and the Post
Hoc Judgment of Insanity or the Antegnostician and the Law, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 4
(1962). See also Goldstein, J. & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?,
72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
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be considered and is responsible for his actions, whatever the origin
of the behavior.22
Responsibility, however, does not necessarily entail punishment.
One may be answerable in other ways. In the case of the epileptic
motorist, denial of a driver's license may suffice. In the case of the
cannibal, indeterminate confinement may be in order.23  In the case
of Eichmann, death.
The conventional position is that the district attorney or grand
jury, and the policeman too, are invested with broad discretion
whether or not to invoke the criminal process.&2 4 Thereupon, the
district attorney has the power under the law to prosecute or not to
prosecute on the charge.2 5 Then there is a preliminary examination
and arraignment at which time the judge may dismiss the charge or
suspend it on certain conditons. In short, there is considerable
flexibility in pre-trial stages. The individual's mental condition-
particularly when he is psychotic-is often in practice taken into
account before filing or proceeding on a criminal charge. However,
when the case goes to trial, and particularly when the verdict is
returned, flexibility in disposition to a considerable extent goes out
the window. The judge, one might even suggest, is allowed less
discretion than the policeman or district attorney.26
At a trial, the fact of the accused's commission of an act that is
a menace to society might very well be established apart from any
test of responsibility. However, apparently no matter how strongly
22 Consider also the trial in Israel of the assistant conductor of the National Opera,
Hirsch Barenblat, a Jew who as recently discovered, served as a policeman for the
Nazi. Refusal to help Eichmann's "transportation" experts would have meant im-
mediate death. Even under duress, cooperation was betrayal. See Time, March 22,
1963, p. 31.
[3 T]he disposition of different types of criminals must be individually deter-
mined according to the nature of the offender. Some may react favorably to punish-
ment, others require incarceration along with therapy, and again with others there
is no alternative but permanent custodial segregation from society. The fundamental
principle, however, no matter what practical disposition is made, is that every person
must be held responsible for the consequences of his acts. ALEXANDER & STAUB, Tim
CIUMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 131 (1956).
2, See Goldstein, A., The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); cf. Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69
YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
21 See Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 18 (1940); Slovenko,
The Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 Tur. L. REv. 47 (1957).
"6 The policeman or district attorney is allowed discretion because a charge of
crime carries consequences almost, if not as serious, as the trial itself. An accusation
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the facts or even practical experience support such a change, it is
difficult to make the change in a legal system long designed on a
different plan. Under the existing system, however, the McNaghten
test, liberally applied, is as good as any of the various moral tests
which the jury may use in deciding guilt or innocence.
Guilt or innocence of crime is a moral or social question, and it
is the function of the judge and jury as the community's representa-
tive to make that decision and to apply the sanctions deemed appro-
priate.2T After all, the definition of crime is socially determined.
Society decides what is crime, and it has the right to decide what
evidence it will hear. The concept of liability in criminal law has
its origin in ethics, philosophy and canon law, not psychiatry. The
1843 McNaghten rule, strictly applied, leaves no place whatsoever for
psychiatric testimony, yet the psychiatrist nonetheless is continually
being called to the stand. Why, but why? Why is he asked to testify
whether an accused knows right from wrong? Why is he even sum-
moned to the courtroom? Why is not a cleric or a philosopher
called? The psychiatrist is not self-invited; he is not a trespasser.
He is called, and then curiously enough, legal commentators and
others complain that psychiatry is corrupting the procedure. One-
would assume that judge and jury were obtained for the purpose
of deciding responsibility. Perhaps judge and jury are not up to the
task. There is an old saying that a rescuer is soon looked upon with
disdain by the rescued.
Contrary to what is alleged, strict construction of the McNaghtenr
rule ends up with the medical profession supplanting law in de-
termining legal responsibility. Liberal application of the !ule, on,
the other hand, by putting lay or medical evidence before the jury,
allows them to think, to weigh the evidence, and to reach a genuine-
decision of their own. The requirement that a psychiatrist testify
solely and entirely in the framework of right-and-wrong operates in-
action to transfer the responsibility of decision-making from the jury
of crime has an infaming effect. Furthermore, unless bail is available, the accused*
may await trial for months, sometimes years, in a shabby cell in the local jailhouse,
where conditions do not usually measurevip to those in the prison where he is sent
following trial and conviction (and time waiting for trial need not be credited toward,-
sentence).
2 See de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 339, 848 (1955).
See also Kuh, Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 771 (1962).
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to the expert (although in theory the ultimate verdict of guilt or
innocence lies with the jury). Strict construction and application of
the McNaghten rule simplifies the work of the court, or rather,
it leaves the court with nothing to do.
All that the psychiatrist can properly do is give his evaluation of
the offender's personality, and to leave it to the jury to apply a moral
test of guilt or innocence. One might compare medical testimony
in personal injury litigation: the proper function of the doctor there
is to give evidence on the physical impairment that the victim has
suffered, and not the percentage of disability, which is an economic
and social issue. In the criminal law process, it is in recommending
disposition where the psychiatrist (and also psychologist and social
worker) can most helpfully assist the court in arriving at a reason-
able disposition of the case through some form or combination
of punishment, custody and treatment.28  Upon conviction, or ac-
21 Robert Waelder has suggested the following as a guide:
Diagnostic Characterization Disposition
Dangerous Punishment and Treatment
Deterrable
Treatment
Dangerous Punishment
Deterrable
Not treatable
Dangerous Preventive Custody and Treatment
Not deterrable
Treatable
Dangerous Preventive Custody
Not deterrable
Not treatable
Not dangerous Punishment with Probationary Period
Deterrable and Treatment
Treatable
Not dangerous Punishment, perhaps with Probationary
Deterrable Period
Not treatable
Not dangerous Treatment
Not deterrable
Treatable
Not dangerous Release
Not deterrable
Not treatable
Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. R v.
378, 390 (1952). See also Rocir, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); Monroe, The Role of the
Psychiatrist in Determining Criminal Responsibility (address delivered at Tulane
Law School, Mar. 20, 1957); Erickson, Psychiatry and the Law: An Attempt at Synthesis,
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quittal, the court might ask the psychiatrist for his prognosis and
the therapy, if any, which might benefit the defendant.29 This is
indeed the growing practice today in cases of conviction where a
pre-sentence report is obtained. In cases of acquittal, however, the
criminal court judge in many jurisdictions is without authority to
commit under the mental health laws, even when the defendant is
in need of immediate care and treatment, or when he is potentially
and seriously dangerous to self or others.30
It is more than time to shift attention from meaningless refine-
ments in the rule of criminal responsibility to the matter of dis-
1961 DuKE L.J. 30; Jenkins, Psychiatry at the Crossroads, 106 Am. J. oF l'sVci,&TRY
358 (1949).
2 Disposition is a decision left to the judge without the jury. The jury has nothing
to do with the question of punishment or treatment (except in capital cases where
the death penalty may be remitted), but only with guilt or innocence. See, e.g., State
v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 50 (1933). Consequently, comment during the trial
on a post-conviction rehabilitation program is considered irrelevant. One reason for un-
justified acquittals is the repugnance felt by jurors regarding penal treatment. As
a general rule, it is a good thing for a person to know the consequences of his decision,
yet in criminal administration, jurors go uninformed. See Slovenko, Control Over
the Jury Verdict in Louisiana Criminal Law, 20 LA. L. Rxv. 657, 678 (1960). It is
argued that psychiatric testimony ought to be kept out of a trial because it may
turn the trial into a "psychiatric seminar," confusing the jury by highly technical
language. A special sentencing authority is frequently proposed to decide the appro-
priate combination of treatment and punishment. See GLUEcK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
(1962); Segre, Criminal Insanity, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1963, p. 16, col. 3.
A literal, strict application of the McNaghten rule would keep psychiatric testimony out
of the trial stage of the proceeding. Few individuals would be acquitted under a
literal application of the McNaghten test, and if convicted, the individual could be
placed in an evaluation center, such as the Kansas Diagnostic and Reception Center at
Topeka, where a rehabilitation program might be worked out. Under Kansas law,
the judge on sentencing is given authority to send the convicted person to the Center
for sixty days and on the basis of the report, the judge may withdraw or lessen the
sentence, place the defendant on probation or arrange some other rehabilitation
program. As the judge is not allowed to increase the sentence, it is felt that no one
will complain as to the judge's exercise of post-sentence jurisdiction. However, the
procedure may result in a tendency to convict. Offhand, it seems that the Kansas law,
allowing the formulation of a program during a 60-day post-sentence period, ties in
best with a literal application of the McNaghten rule. This will be a curious out-
come for the McNaghten rule. There is considerable discussion on the merit
of psychiatric testimony during a trial, where as a result of the adversary process and
a lay jury, it tends to confusion and misapplication. The McNaghten rule, or no
rule, may after all work out best with the expressed desideratum of leaving psychiatric
evaluation to the treatment stage, i.e., the post-trial stage. With the development
of diagnostic post-sentence clinics, the McNaghten rule may turn out to be the best of
the rules (if we must have a legal rule on criminal insanity).
10 See generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness-Some Observa-
tions on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALF L.J.
225 (1960); Reid, Disposition of the Criminally Insane, 16 RutGERs L. REv. 75 (1961);
Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38
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position.3 1 The quest for a formula for guilt or innocence has
simply led to garble.
The trouble is not with the formulation, but rather with the
basic idea of using a moral test of guilt or innocence that rigidly
controls disposition. The solution is not to formulate rules that
will be used in a mechanical way to let criminals out on the street;
that will displace the prison population into mental hospitals, which
then become prisons in disguise; or that will send treatable persons
to prisons.32 Adequate flexibility ought to be written into the law
so as to permit commitment to civil hospitals both before and after
indictment or trial, when the defendant would be suitable for the
hospital.33 Flexibility is the keynote; different methods suit different
people. It is the same, for example, with fish: some are speared;
others are taken with the line; and others in the encircling net.
The McNaghten and other rules of criminal responsibility and the
rule on fitness to stand trial are being manipulated and distorted to
achieve as best they can this flexibility.
The experience under the Massachusetts Briggs Law34 providing
for psychiatric examination of all persons accused of certain crimes
is reportedly promising. So are the clinics, such as the Baltimore
Criminal Court Clinic, designed to aid courts in assessing cases for
commitment to mental hospitals, in decisions as to sentencing, and
in providing information for probation officers. There are now
approximately ten criminal courts in metropolitan centers that have
psychiatric clinics as an integral part of the court setup. The clinics
vary markedly in their organization and in the manner in which
they function.35
TE As L. REv. 849 (1960); Note, 1961 DUKE L.J. 481; Comment, Compulsory Commit-
ment Following Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409 (1961).
31See GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 248-80 (1936); ROCHE, Tnm CRIMINAL MIND
(1958).
32 Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, The Law, and The Report of the
American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. Rlv. 1366, 1385 (1961).
88 The judge's discretion to send to a civil hospital, where the law allows it, should
be exercised only when the hospital superintendent advises the court that the de-
fendant would be suitable for his hospital. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
ADMISSION TO MENTAL HOSPITALS UNDER NEW YORK LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE
PRocEss 236 (1962); Rood, The Nonpsychotic Offender and the State Hospital, 115
AM. J. OF PSYCHiATRY 512 (1958). Supervision aids in keeping the hospital alert
to its task. The committing court ought to require reports and inquire periodically
on the mental status of the person committed. See Smith v. Settle, 211 F. Supp. 514
(WMD. Mo. 1962).
81 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, § 100A (1957).
13 Psychiatric court clinics have been established, and reportedly are successfully
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III
CAPACITY TO STAND TRIAL
The McNaghten rule is concerned only with mental capacity at
the time of the offense, only one aspect of the administration of
criminal justice. The law has a different definition of insanity at the
time of trial. Under the law, an accused is eligible for trial only if
he is able to comprehend his position and is able to participate
rationally in his defense.8 6 The competency rule is a by-product
of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent de-
fendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is, in common
language, "out of it" and unable to defend himself. The question
is usually deferred to medical examiners, who as a rule have little
knowledge of what it takes to understand a trial and to assist
counsel.3 7 There is perhaps no better person to decide whether
the case is triable than the defendant's counsel himself, but being
used, in Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Topeka, and Washington, D.C. Ten psychiatric court clinics have been
created in Massachusetts for juvenile and adult criminal courts. See Rymer, The
Dilemma of the Psychiatrist in Forensic Practice, 119 Am. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 857, 861
(1963). But see Goldstein, A., The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process: The Proposals
for an Impartial Expert and for Preventive Detention, 33 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
123 (1963).
31 The issue is one of procedure rather than substance. As it does not bear on the
question of guilt or innocence, a jury trial on the issue is not a requirement. People
ex rel. Klesitz v. Mills, 179 Misc. 58, 37 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1942). See also Krash, The Dur-
ham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of
Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 908 (1961).
87 Judges usually do not adequately instruct the expert on the test of competency.
More often than not, the expert is under the impression that he is to apply the much-
publicized McNaghten rule of criminal responsibility.
The dual examination, or immediate examination of the defendant's state of mind
at time of crime, must face the objection that the constitutional rights of the person
might be violated. It is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the defendant from
his crime. Inquiry into facts relevant to the offense is almost inevitable, hence a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. One might compare Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), a decision to the effect that using a psychiatrist's "wiles" to
get information from a criminal suspect amounts to unconstitutional coerced con-
fession. It has been held that a dual examination is not reversible error when the
defendant "does not object and is willing." See State v. Faciene, 233 La. 1028, 99 So. 2d
333 (1957).
Time-of-trial insanity by itself, not being an element of the crime, is not considered
an issue for the self-incrimination privilege. On principle, though, should the privilege
be considered violated by requiring the accused to talk to a psychiatrist to determine
sanity at time of trial or at time of offense? Shall we say that there is a waiver of the
privilege by urging the defense of insanity? Or should we say that he waives the
defense of insanity (but not the privilege) unless he submits to examination? To
determine insanity at time of crime, it is not essential to ask the defendant about
events of the crime. The courts have held that a defendant against his will can be
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an advocate, his opinion is expected to be biased and it is not used.38
The rule on insanity at the time of trial (which incidentally is
a rule which arose in a day when defendants were not afforded coun-
sel) is actually being used for purposes other than that for which it
was intended. 31 It is, on the one hand, used by defense counsel to
taken out of his cell and observed by a psychiatrist. See Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217,
27 So. 2d 186 (1946); Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936);
State v. Riggle, 298 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1956).
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code suggests a statute which reads in
part as follows:
A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric examination or
treatment... for the purpose of such examination or treatment shall not be ad-
missible in evidence against him in any [criminal] proceeding on any issue other
than that of his mental condition but it shall be admissible upon that issue,
whether or not it would otherwise be deemed to be a privileged communication.
A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Ten. Draft No. 4, § 4.09 (1955).
Under the present law the mental examination is ordinarily limited to a deter-
mination of present mental capacity to proceed. See, e.g., LA. Rev. STAT. § 15:267
(1950). However, when the defense of insanity at the time of the crime is urged
and "becomes an issue in the cause," an examination will be requested which includes
a determination of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime. See
State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So. 2d 315 (1955), 17 LA. L. Rlv. 411 (1957). As a
result of this procedure, the medical expert is led to believe that the defendant is not
ready for trial unless and until he satisfies both the McNaghten test and the test of
triability. Cases are reported where psychiatrists have used the McNaghten rule for
criminal responsibility in measuring competency to make a will. See GUTrTACHER &
%VEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LA-W (1952); Usdin, The Medical Expert, 257 NEw ENG.
J. oF MED. 1220 (1957). One must remember that physicians are trained in medicine,
not law. They are not judges or lawyers in disguise.
Certainly, the reliability of the psychiatric evaluation of the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the offense would be enhanced by immediate or early examina-
tion, and for this reason, a comprehensive examination of the defendant's state of
mind at the time of crime as well as at time of trial has merit. One might consider
the position of the psychiatrist trying to determine the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the offense many months or years after the offense. Cases are not
infrequent where a psychiatrist is asked to report on a person's state of mind at the
time of the offense some fifteen to thirty years after the offense. The defendant may
have been in a psychotic state at the time of the offense and in a state of remission
at the time of trial. The examination, from the viewpoint of reliability, ought to be
near the time of the offense. The physician appointed to determine the defendant's
triability is not always reappointed on the lunacy commission to determine sanity
under the test of responsibility, or even if he is, he may not have focused at the
initial interview on state of mind at time of act.
Provision for appointment of impartial expert or government hospital examina-
tion is made in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, W. Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, District of Columbia and federal courts. See Goldstein & Fine,
The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. Rev.
1061 (1962).
'8 See Szasz, Psychiatry's Threat to Civil Liberties, National Review, Mar. 12, 1963,
p. 191, at 192.
"Weihofen years ago suggested that any reform in the method of trying persons
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delay a trial until the emotions of the prosecuting witnesses and
the public have calmed, or better yet, until their memories have
faded so that the district attorney cannot prove the case "beyond
a reasonable doubt." The plea decreases the probability of prose-
cution.40
While present incapacity to stand trial is usually urged by the
defense, it may also be raised in many jurisdictions by the district
attorney or on the court's own motion. While ostensibly for the
benefit of the accused, this procedure often works to deprive him
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. When defense counsel
is available, there is little justification in allowing the plea of present
insanity by the state. Quite frequently, the district attorney raises
the issue of unfitness to proceed so as to put "undesirables" away in
cold storage without the benefit of trial. (They may not be con-
victed either under the McNaghten or other rules or for lack of
evidence, or they may not be committable under the mental health
laws.)41 The criminal charge serves as little more than a fictional
jurisdictional excuse for indeterminate confinement.42 Criminal
colonies for the insane are filled to a considerable extent with mental
alleged to be insane probably will come through devices for preventing the trial of
mentally disordered persons, rather than through a change in the substantive law or
procedure relating to the question of responsibiltiy. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISOPIERS AS
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428 (1954).
10 Summoned to court but frustrated in giving testimony under the McNaghten
rule, strictly applied, some psychiatrists turn to the present capacity rule to tell their
tale. Usually as a part of defense strategy, it achieves the same end of avoiding the
imposition of criminal punishment. Consider the colloquy published in Symposium:
The Law and Psychiatry, 109 J. oF LA. STATE MED. SOc'Y 141, 157 (1957).
" On the right of the State to raise the issue of competency, see Foote, A Comment
on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832 (1960);
Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity, 53 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 129 (1962);
see also State v. Swails, 233 La. 751, 66 So. 2d 796 (1953). Former Maj. Gen. Edwin
A. Walker, following the rioting on the University of Mississippi campus, was ordered
to undergo psychiatric examination. The United States Attorney maintained the order
was legal, saying that such examinations are permissible any time after an arrest. AP
News-Release, Nov. 21, 1962. The ACLU, among others defended General Walker's
Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy and public trial which the government allegedly
sought to deny by committing him to a "mental prison." See ACLU Weekly Bulletin
No. 2154 (Oct. 15, 1962); Editorial, The Nation, Jan. 12, 1963. "If uncontested, the
examination would have been carried out by government psychiatrists at the Federal
Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Is this sound procedure, particularly since the
U.S. Government is a party to the litigation against Walker? Yet, this is how the
law stands, and how it is ordinarily administered. Imagine that instead of General
Walker, the defendant is John Doe. How would he defend himself against the
charge-for that's what it is-of mental illness?" Szasz, Psychiatry's Threat to Civil
Liberties, National Review, Mar. 12, 1963, p. 179. Poet Ezra Pound spent World War
H broadcasting for Mussolini. The U.S. found him mentally unfit to face treason
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defectives, usually harmless individuals. Take, for example, the
person who makes a nuisance of himself by peeping into a woman's
bedroom. He is picked up on a charge of vagrancy which carries a
light penalty, but as he is usually a mental defective, he will never
be able to understand a trial or assist counsel, and he spends the rest
of his days forgotten in a criminal colony. His chance of ever being
put to trial is rare, but should it occur, time in commitment is not
credited toward sentence' 2
What is the nature of the mental disorder or deficiency that re-
quires a stay of criminal proceedings? 43 Mental illness, standing
charges and he spent twelve years in a federal hospital. He has been living in Italy
since 1958. See Szasz, Politics and Mental Health: Some Remarks Apropos of the Case
of Mr. Ezra Pound, 115 Am. J. Psychiatry 508 (1958).
The confidentiality of communications is also a matter of concern. See A.L.I. Model
Penal Code, supra note 37. See also Slovenko 8: Usdin, Privileged Communication and
Right of Privacy in Diagnosis and Therapy, 3 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIc THERAPIES 277
(Masserman ed. 1963).
42AII too often, when a conviction cannot be obtained on the merits, the court
and the district attorney ignore or overrule a finding by the confining institution that
the individual should be returned to court. Consider:
A 35-year old 'forgotten man' committed to the East Louisiana state hospital
at Jackson 15 years ago was released from custody Monday. Ordered released
was Cleveland Journet, Negro, 35, who was committed to the mental institution
in 1946 after a lunacy commission declared him incompetent to stand trial for
simple burglary. . . . The case against him was dismissed seven years ago by
the district attorney's office as being 'too old' for further prosecution but word
of this apparently never reached officials at the hospital. New Orleans Times-
Picayune, Oct. 24, 1961, p. 3, § 3, col. 3.
See also de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 349 (1955).
'" Mental illness, mental deficiency or physical disabilities are grounds to stay a
trial. In some cases, the defendant may never be in a position to stand trial. For
example, mental defectives, as noted, do not and cannot recover. On mens rea of the
feebleminded to commit crime, see Pieski, Subnormal Mentality As a Defense in the
Criminal Law, 15 VAND. L. Rnv. 769 (1962).
Trial is delayed in the case of a paranoid individual who is obviously wrapped up
in a delusional system which encompasses events on trial.
Capacity to stand trial includes the ability to recall events so that the accused can
furnish his counsel with facts needed to present his defense. State ex rel. Davey v.
Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1937). Some individuals however are likely to
react to the emotional trauma of committing a crime by a process of forgetting. A
passive individual who on a rare occasion bursts out in anger may blot out all recol-
lection of the commission of a crime. Recollection via psychoanalysis or sodium
amythal may result in psychotic breakdown. The separation of the malingerer from
the genuine amnesic is difficult and requires a long period of observation, and can
then usually be ascertained by the jail attendant. See Mayer-Gross, Salter & Roth,
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 133 (1955); Coburn & Fahr, Amnesia and the Lazo, 41 IOwA L.
R.V. 369 (1956); Diamond, The Simulation of Sanity, 2 J. oF SOCiAL TErAPy (1956);
Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Prmt. L. Rav. 593 (1960).
Among frequent cases, one was recently reported that a negro woman suffering from
amnesia was committed to the criminal colony in a "hospital" rather than brought
to trial for murder because she was unable to remember the circumstances of the crime
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alone, is not tantamount to mental incapacity to stand trial. It seems
that the law intends a postponement of trial only when the individual
is obviously disoriented and his mode of communication is so radi-
and assist her defense. See Louisiana State Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure
Revision, Expos& des Motifs, No. 19, p. 3 (Mar. 8, 1963). A defendant may have no
recollection of behavior while under the influence of alcohol. One court has held
that a defendant who is an alcoholic and suffers from "alcoholic amnesia" is fit to
stand trial, since it is not "a result of a mental disease or defect." See State v. Palmer,
232 La. 468, 94 So. 2d 439 (1957).
Physical illness may be claimed to stay a trial, perhaps indefinitely. An individual
may be so aged, or so deaf, that he is unable to hear any of the proceedings at the
trial, but here a remedy is to read or repeat the testimony to him. Felts v. Murphy, 201
U.S. 123 (1906). A deaf-mute, or one who speaks in a low unclear voice, and is unable
to write, is not able to go to trial. An individual may not be able to go to trial
because of a heart condition. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 18, 1962, p. 13, § 1,
ol. 3.
Convicted Soviet spy Robert Soblen, suffering from incurable lymphatic leukemia,
contended that necessary medication caused him to sleep throughout the trial pro-
ceedings and thus on appeal he argued that he should not have been put to trial. He
spent most of the trial curled up in a special contour chair, specially rented by the
court. Most of the time his eyes were closed. National Observer, Sept. 17, 1962. "When
the case was reached for trial, Dr. Soblen's condition had deteriorated and he could
not function in the courtroom without having heavy sedation and the administration
of other drugs. Sedatives administered included demerol, thorazine, other tranquilizers
and other analgesics. He was also on cortisone preparations both before and during
the trial. By the very nature of that form of leukemia, Dr. Soblen would have been
frequently in great pain throughout the trial due to pressure of the enlarged spleen
and enlarged liver. This made it frequently difficult for him to sit. Toward the end
of the trial his condition worsened to such a degree that it was necessary for him to
lie on a couch in the courtroom which he did by leave of the court. He was in a
sleepy state during a great part of the trial and was frequently, even when awake,
unable to follow the trial proceeding. . . . Under the circumstances, we feel that
defendant was deprived of his day in court. While he was physically present, albeit
in a horizontal posture, his state of mind, induced by required sedation, made him
mentally absent. This would be so even in an ordinary case; it is much more true in
a case involving the dramatic tensions of brother testifying against brother, of testimony
covering a span of 40 years, and of circumstances which demanded a mind most alert,
perceptive and vigilant." Brief of Amici Curiae in support of petition for writ of
certiorari in Soblen v. United States, May 29, 1962, pp. 2-3, 5.
In a trial in early 1962 in Dallas, William E. Lydy refused to talk to his court-
appointed defense lawyer, who as a result did not know how to present a defense.
The defendant went on a food strike, and in a limp condition he had to be taken
in a wheelchair to court.
There are individuals who pull themselves together in the criminal unit at the
hospital simply by being left alone, but they may relapse when returned for trial due
to brutality at the local jailhouse or to the rigor of unduly vigorous cross-examination
at trial.
The Georgetown University Law Center and the Judicial Conference of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in 1962 undertook a comprehensive study of the law in
theory and practice relating to pre-trial mental examination in criminal cases in the
District of Columbia. Statistical studies are being made relating to motions for mental
examination and disposition thereof, as well as studies reflecting the attitudes of
local judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and psychiatrists, and also the type and scope
of the mental examination.
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cally, severely and clearly different from that of other persons that
it is obvious to one and all. The law has gone off on a tangent,
however, and looks about for some sort of expert. A psychiatrist
is acknowledged in effect as a high priest to decide whether a person
will go on trial. More often than not, the demands of private prac-
ice or crowded institutions preclude a competent psychiatric exam-
ination (even assuming that it were needed), or the task is performed
as a dull chore.44 The expert all too frequently expresses an opinion
on nothing more than a ten to sixty-minute interview,4 and for his
efforts he is paid an unusually handsome fee.46 Actually, the jail
attendant, experienced with the criminal element and able to ob-
serve the accused around the clock, can make an evaluation sufficient-
ly adequate to assist the court in determining capacity to stand
trial. The attendant's crude description, "he's a psycho" or
"weirdo," is all that is needed. Anything more subtle than what
the jail attendant can detect ought not to be a basis to stay a trial,
and indeed results in injustice and perversion of the criminal process.
Besides, a psychiatrist's evaluation which does not follow the at-
"' There are, of course, examiners who patiently and diligently undertake the task
of examination, and accept the responsibility only when they can do so.
'"A medical diagnosis sometimes can be made in a few minutes, e.g., of a non-
malingerer who sees butterflies flying around his head, but not so of a person who
is not completely fallen apart. The following statements, on file, by persons "ex-
amined" by members of lunacy commissions indicate the nature of the examination,
which is occurring frequently: "He asked me a few little things, the whole of five
minutes I would say. He asked me a few little things about my private life and then
he left." "He talked to me for a whole three minutes. He didn't even look at me
and then on the stand he is swearing . . . but, actually, when I say three minutes
I might be saying that to emphasize the fact that it was no examination and I wasn't
talked to at all." "I will give him maybe five mintues that he talked to me." "He
didn't even stay three minutes." "He came in, said 'hello' and asked me my father's
name and then he said 'that's all.'" The brevity of the examination, while it may be
criticized for other reasons, may well indicate that capacity to stand trial is determinable
by the obvious (while, for diagnosis for psychotherapy, a different type of examination,
one in depth, is necessary).
,0 The usual fee is $150 in Louisiana, $100-250 in Ohio, $100 in Connecticut. See
Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110
U. PA. L. Rlv. 1061 (1962). Justice Brennan of the Supreme Court expresses the
opinion that psychiatrists should give their services free to indigent defendants who
plead insanity. Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Mentally IlU
Criminals, 49 A.B.A.J. 239 (1963).
More often than not, psychological testing, consisting of a battery of tests (while
an abstraction of an abstraction), can be more helpful than the report of the psychia-
trist, which is usually based on a brief interview. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) ruled that qualified psychologists may present to juries expert opinions
about the mental condition of a defendant when insanity is an issue.
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tendant's appraisal is suspect and subject to further investigation."7
It is not proposed that the jail attendant should supplant the
psychiatrist as the "expert" on an accused's fitness to stand trial. The
point is that fitness to stand trial ought to be measured by an
ordinary view. The judge really ought to judge, in theory as well
as in fact. He can by himself make the decision on the basis of a
few ordinary and simple questions put to the defendant (e.g., What
is the year? Who is the President of the United States? What are
the colors of the American flag?). There is no need for a diagnosis in
depth. One must make an examination for the purpose that it is
going to be used. The sort of evaluation needed for measuring
triability is not the same as that needed for medical treatment or
other purposes.
The question of fitness to plead and stand trial is really much
more urgently in need of attention than is the McNaghten rule.
IV
CAPACITY TO STAND EXECUTION
There is another stage in criminal proceedings involving mental
capacity. An individual who is considered legally sane at the time
of offense and throughout the trial proceeding may become insane
at the time scheduled for execution. There is a rule of law, founded
on dubious reasons, that a psychotic person cannot be executed (but
a sane person can be).48 In the United States, it usually takes several
17 Hess g: Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results, and Prob-
lems, 119 Are. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 713, 719-20 (1963). Lay witnesses under the law of
evidence are allowed to give an opinion on mental condition. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612 (1884); 25 TUL. L. Ruv. 518 (1951), 7 Mo. L. REv. 60
(1942).
"$The rule that an insane person cannot be executed is well established, but the
logic and policy behind the rule is vague. The explanations for the exemption rule
include: (1) if the defendant is sane he might urge some reason not previously con-
sidered why the sentence should not be carried out (yet the same logic would suffice
to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the execution of a sane man, for time for intelligent
reflection may disclose new reasons for stay of execution of the sane as well); (2)
killing an insane person does not have the same moral quality as killing a sane person;
(3) a person should not be put to death while insane because in that condition he is
unable to make his peace with God. Under the law, the imposition of the penalty
is required when the prisoner is restored to sanity. See Hazard & LouiscII, Death, The
State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1962).
In the majority of states, the issue of post-conviction insanity may be raised only
by the warden (or sheriff) having custody of the prisoner. The United States Supreme
Court, in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), said that the manner of procedural
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years before legal maneuvers have been exhausted,49 and by that
time, the prisoner, sitting in isolation on death's row, has a mental
breakdown, or he feigns it to save his neck. He is thereupon trans-
ferred to the security area of a hospital where he usually lives out
the rest of his days.50 Here again the law casts upon the physician a
non-medical question: Tell us when this man is ready to be electro-
cuted. The test supposedly is that the condemned person must
effectuation of exemption for insanity is a matter of grace, not of right, and hence
the state is under no obligation to provide a hearing. Thus, the execution of the
capital penalty lies very much in the attitude of the warden toward the penalty.
"Lunden, Time Lapse Between Sentence and Execution: The United States and
Canada Compared, 48 A.BA.J. 1043 (1962).
1o Malingering is often difficult to ascertain. Even though a person is acting, he
may still be psychotic. A person close to psychosis can readily act it; he can feel it.
A person would have to be observed over a period of time in order adequately to
establish a diagnosis. Prisoners on death row as a last resort usually feign in-
sanity in order to escape a pending execution. They learn, either from their attorneys
or from the grapevine, that under the law psychosis precludes execution, and they
act upon the information. However, in most cases, attorneys do not suggest or direct
the patient to act in a psychotic manner, but simply advise on the law. The follow-
ing is typical, and is from a tape recording:
Examiner at hospital: "Tell me what happened at the penitentiary to make them
send you to the hospital."
Patient (formerly prisoner): "Nothing."
Examiner: "Huh?"
Patient: "My lawyer came and got me."
Examiner: "Your lawyer came and got you? Are you afraid of dying?"
Patient: (No answer).
Examiner: "Did your lawyer tell you what to do to get out of there?"
Patient: "No."
Examiner: "Looks to me like a good lawyer would have told you how to act. He
didn't tell you how to act?"
Patient: (Inaudible mumbles).
Examiner: "I didn't understand you. He told you to act crazy?"
Patient: "Un-hum."
Examiner: "What did he say?"
Patient: "He kept telling me to . . . (inaudible)."
Examiner: "Kept telling you what?"
Patient: "The last time he came up . .. (inaudible)."
Examiner: "The last time he came up, what did he do?"
Patient: "He asked if I ever had an epileptic fit."
Examiner: "What did you tell him?"
Patient: "I told him no."
Examiner: "What did he say then?"
Patient: "He said that an epileptic fit was the last straw." [In the lingo, an epi-
leptic fit is the way of a crazy man.]
Examiner: "He told you this?"
Patient: "Yes."
Examiner: "Did he tell you how to act?"
Patient: "No, he didn't want to incriminate himself."
Examiner: "He told you that he did not want to incriminate himself?"
Patient: "That's right."
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realize he is to be electrocuted for the crime he has committed. Yet
this test can be applied by the jail warden, if we are to have such
a test. As applied, the physician is asked to get his patient well so
that he can be electrocuted-a curious footnote to the Hippocratic
oath. 31
The procedure casts upon the physician the responsibilty of the
execution of the death penalty. The judge at the trial is relieved
of the decision by the jury, a group so large that individual responsi-
bility is lost. Yet, in the end, the law places the decision on one indi-
vidual-the physician. It is not surprising that physicians are
reluctant to oblige. Literature is abundant urging the abolition of
the death penalty. To a considerable extent, the discussion on the
death penalty is much ado about nothing. Criminals are sentenced
to death, but in recent years the execution of the sentence is the
exception rather than the rule.52
In addition to the rule that a condemned man cannot be executed
while insane, the law also makes mention of prisoners under sentences
for life or years, but the provision has little practical application. It
is indeed a rare prisoner who seeks a transfer from prison to the
security unit of a mental institution, where conditions are deplorable
and where he is likely to be forgotten for the rest of his life. The
claim of insanity as an exemption from punishment is exercised
almost always only by death row prisoners who have exhausted all
legal maneuvers to stay execution.
The exemption from execution, just as the right-wrong test of
criminal responsibility and the test of capacity to stand trial, presents
a non-medical question, yet here again a physician is delegated the
Examiner: "So he didn't tell you how to act. But he got his point across to you?"
Patient: (Inaudible).
Examiner: "Huh? How did you know how to act when he told you about epileptic
fits?"
Patient: "I just knew."
" As one might well guess, prognosis is quite poor as there is no motivation for
recovery. The physician is also placed in an awkward situation as should treatment
result in recovery, it can only be detrimental to the inmate.
12 The actual execution of the death penalty is localized in a few states, namely,
California, 8 in 1961; South Carolina and Mississippi, 5 each; Virginia, 4; and Georgia
and Texas, 3. At the beginning of 1961, there were 212 prisoners in the United
States under the sentence of death. During 1961, a total of 136 prisoners received
death sentences, bringing the total cases under a death sentence to 348. During 1961,
42 were executed. The aforementioned 6 states, out of 44 jurisdictions whose statutes
provide for legal execution, accounted for 28 or two-thirds of the 42 executions carried
out in 1961. NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, No. 28 (April 1962).
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decision. The rules on capacity to stand trial and to face execution
are being used today paralegally, one might say sub rosa, to achieve
ends which may or may not have merit. The rule on capacity to
stand trial is being subverted to avoid a trial or to put a person in
cold storage. The rule on insanity at time of execution is being
used to avoid the law on capital punishment.
It has been stated that laws ought to be formulated and applied
with a view towards existing institutions, otherwise they are imprac-
tical or imprudent. Yet, the raison d'etre of security treatment units
in a public hospital, where individuals are sent who are unable to
stand trial or who become psychotic in prison, has yet to be studied.
The need for such units is still to be demonstrated. All that is
accomplished, if anything, in a criminal unit in most hospitals can
be better accomplished in prison. Strange as it may seem, prisons
usually have more to offer now in the way of facilities for the inmate,
as well as in the way of protection against escape. 53 Inmates in hos-
pital security units usually sit day in and day out in a congested
and smelly room, and idly look at television. There is no one to
supervise work activities or anything else. Hospital attendants with
a modicum of intelligence and medical supervision administer drugs,
and this can equally well be done at the prison. Individuals awaiting
trial or execution can do their waiting in prison.
V
MENTAL ABNORMALITY IN RELATION TO CRIME
The point of all this is that the law should make use of the
knowledge of other disciplines, not cast upon them the responsibility
of making its decisions. In the area of criminal administration, the
law ought not to ask the physician whether the accused knew right
from wrong, or whether the accused understands the nature of trial
and how to assist counsel, or the meaning of execution. Yet, the
"Many hospitals directors have expressed concern about sending certain defendants
to "security treatment units" in hospitals. The unit usually has inadequate facilities
and attendants for guarding them. The unit, to say the least, has minimum security
protection. Curiously enough, death row patients transferred from the penitentiary
to the hospital are warned that misbehavior will result in their being sent back "to
fry." The capital-penalty abolitionist ought to take note that here, where imposition
of the death penalty can be expected, it serves as a deterrent. Every now and then,
the hospital director, to show he means business, returns an unruly inmate to the
penitentiary. These account for the majority of executions actually carried out.
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law does these things and then some spokesmen complain that the
law is being supplanted by other disciplines.
Profesor Hall, among others, contends that psychiatry makes
nonsense of personal responsibility. The criticism is very much in
vogue these days that psychiatry is undermining individual responsi-
bility. Freudianism is allegedly the culprit for contemporary Ameri-
can permissiveness. It is curious to see that the attack on Freud
and his discipline comes from opposite directions. The Marxists
dismiss Freud as "subjective" or idealistic. Professor Hall, and
others, criticize the discipline as being "deterministic."
Psychoanalysis sets a high value and standard on a human being.
A person is seen an enormous amount of time in a dyadic relation-
ship. He is seen by one person (admittedly at a substantial monetary
reward) for hundreds of hours in psychoanalysis (and to a lesser
but still considerable extent in other fields of psychiatry). There is
no other endeavor where a person receives such undivided attention.
It is a premium placed on the individual unheard of in totalitarian
systems.
It must be noted that patients in psychotherapy are taught to pay
attention to, and assume responsibility for, their behavior. Suc-
cessful therapy calls for hard work on the part of the patient, often
more painful than a major operation. A person cannot be treated
until he feels he is responsible. Indeed, respect for the basic dignity
of human beings assumes that they are responsible individuals who,
even in their sickest state, know right from wrong and retain some
elements of choice, however small. All delinquents are responsible
for what they do, and no matter how mentally ill or bizarre they
seem to be, they are best treated as responsible individuals. At
some clinics even a psychotic who, for example, breaks a lamp is
made to pay for it. 4
Consideration of the individual as responsible is a force which
plays a role in the behavior of a person. The term "determinism,"
" The neurotic does not get well until he accepts responsibility, and for example,
no longer blames mother for what she did to him when he was young, although what
she did continues to hurt. In the case of the overtly psychotic, the therapist is the
ego for the patient and accepts responsibility for him, until bit by bit the patient,
incorporating the ego of the therapist, is able to pull himself together. On treating
the delinquent as responsible, see Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58
CoLu-.f. L. REV. 183 (1958). For the views of another writer who values highly the
place of responsibility, see Haines, Dispensing With Responsibility, 38 PHILosorY 69(1963).
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properly used, means simply that inner and outer forces have an
effect on a person. Some forces have more effect than others, but
all have an effect. The abnormal person does not react rationally
to the influences of the outer world but reads past situations into
them. He does not react to outer stimuli appropriately, but always
according to definite patterns or reaction acquired in the course of
childhood. The past always predominates because, not differenti-
ating sufficiently between present and past, he always misunder-
stands the present in the sense of his unsolved past. As the saying
goes, the abnormal person is forever being blackmailed by his
childhood. Psychotherapy hopefully will allow an individual to act
without being so bound by the past. Psychotherapy aims at the
rescue of the patient from a psychopathological state. Neurosis
means maladaptive behavior; the past inappropriately governs the
present. We all wish at times that we could act differently, but some
memories adversely influence us. A kleptomaniac or pyromaniac,
for example, is driven to steal or burn almost as forcefully as one
must have a bowel movement. He does not act "freely." An indi-
vidual's action at any given moment are the product of all the forces,
external and internal, past and present, which have played on him
and are playing on him. New forces and influences, however, are
continually being added which may alter the end product. Thera-
peutic influence is a new causal factor brought to bear on the patient.
Psychotherapy as a new determining influence in the patient's life
can be optimistic only because of the principle of determinism. 5"
Although it is easier to be retrospective than prospective, the
news media and lawyers bring the house down on psychiatry when-
ever the perpetrator of a crime had previously been in treatment or
hospitalization for a mental disorder. The psychiatric profession,
" Robert P. Knight observes that the divergence in views between law and psychi-
try is not over the question of responsibility-both law and psychiatry assume indi-
vidual, personal responsibility, and that there is actually no issue here of "free will."
Knight states the divergence is over the question of what should be done with those
whose unlawful acts indicate that their sense of personal and social responsibility is
insufficient to hold their behavior within the law. The lawyers declare that when
laws are broken the culprits must be convicted and punished. The psychiatrists say
that punishment has no salutary effect on many such persons; that some of them arc
uninfluenceable by any known methods of management and therefore must be re-
strained for the protection of society; but that many would be more likely to become
rehabilitated through treatment and re-education, were it available, than through
punishment. See Knight, Determinism, "Freedom" and Psvchotherapy, 9 PSYCHIATRY
251 (1946).
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they say, is responsible for "accurate prognosis." The community is
"perturbed by the massive evidence that persons guilty of spectacular
violence are so often alumni of one of the many psychiatric institu-
tions .... No doubt the doctor will sometimes fail, despite his best
effort; but an uneasy laity will be hard to convince that he must
fail his obligations as frequently as he has been failing them in recent
years."5 6 It is interesting to compare, on the other hand, the lack
of concern over present-day prison policy, which is ludicrous in
the extreme. It is estimated that between 70 to 80% of persons
released from prison commit further crime and are back again in
a couple of years. Present-day prison policy is to let a prisoner
out the back door as one is brought in the front door. A life
sentence is served on a revolving installment basis, with crimes
in between. Every dog is entitled to one bite; a criminal in a de-
mocracy, some seem to say, is entitled to two murders, but, believe
it or not, there are in prison (and outside) three and four-time
murderers. In many communities there is a flagrant failure to en-
force the criminal laws. Wiliam H. Parker, Chief of Police of Los
Angeles, observes:
I don't say that there aren't crimes committed by persons who will not
repeat the act. I think there definitely is a field for rehabilitation. But
many criminals are hardened by the time they get into the penitentiary-
they have been dealt with again and again, first as a juvenile and in no
custody, then in the lower courts and in community jails. By the time
they arrive in the penitentiary they are confirmed criminals.Gr
Yet here the lawyer and the public are strangely silent and turn their
face the other way like the three little monkeys of no evil.
Psychiatrists are expected to make predictions about mental
patients in terms of absolute certainties, an impossibility, even
though the evidence has none of the glaring nature and is not as
solid as that concerning the habitual criminal. The contrast in atti-
tudes is indeed remarkable. One reason for the cold storage of
individuals who are committed to a hospital criminal colony is the
court order asking the psychiatrist to predict that there is absolutely
no danger in discharge. It seems that here the court, not psychiatry,
is proclaiming a doctrine of complete, universil determinism. No
56Johnson, Psychiatrists and the Public, New Republic, Dec. 8, 1962, p. 12. See
New Orleans States-Item, June 1, 1962, p. 1; Nov. 14, 1962, p. 1; Pittsburgh Press, June
1, 1962, p. 1.
"7 Interview by Donald McDonald with William H. Parker, The Police, CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSIT-UTIONS (1962).
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one-not even a psychiatrist-can honestly make a prediction as
accurate as here demanded by the court. The psychiatrist generally
refuses to make such a prediction, and the individual sits in con-
finement. This state of affairs is not due to the "youth" of psychia-
try. It is inherent in the nature of things. A condition of predicting
is information about all relevant parameters. As Waelder puts it:
Nobody can expect predictions when relevant parameters are unknown.
The physicist predicts what will happen in an artificial set-up of his
own construction-e.g., in an electronic tube-the parameters of which are
known to him. But he will not predict what will happen inside a volcano
where conditions are only incompletely known-whether or not it will
erupt within a certain period of time.
Similarly, it makes no sense to expect a psychoanalyst to predict a
particular person's future behavior which depends, in part, on future
events in this person's environment and the kind of stress or opportunity
that he will meet, as well as on future developments in his bodily organ-
ism (as illnesses); these are all factors which may be determined in their
own way, but which the analyst has no way of knowing. As the physicist
predicts not what happens in empirical systems but rather what happens
under specific conditions, so the analyst can reasonably be asked to
predicts not what happens in empirical systems but rather what happens
under unknown conditions but as it will be under specific conditions.
Thus, we cannot expect him to say what the future destiny of his
analysand will be, but he may be asked to predict how this analysand
would stand up to a particular stress, for example, to a traumatic experi-
ence of the kind that had started him on his neurosis ....
He will also judge, in some cases, that the patient will be able to deal
with ordinary pressures without renewed breakdown; in others, that he
will be able to deal with such mild pressures only as he may meet in
a favorable environment; and in a few cases, perhaps, he will be confident
that the patient can meet whatever comes ....
In any case, [predictions of this kind] . . . are merely probabilistic;
they predict a probable, not a certain development.58
As regards the test of criminal responsibility, strict construction-
ists, in the way they view and apply things, are caught between the
Scylla of McNaghten, where few are exempt from criminal re-
sponsibility and punishment, and the Charybdis of Durham and
" Waelder, Psychic Determinism and the Possibility of Predictions, 32 PsYcHO-
ANALY IC Q. 15, 30-31 (1963). See also Booth, Values in Nature and Psychotherapy, 8
ARCHVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 22 (1963). Science of the present time does not claim
absoluteness or infallibility, or "iron laws of necessity." It yields probable knowledge,
on which we act. See Lee, A Criticism of the Marxian Interpretation of History, 1
TULANE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 95 (1952); Slovenko, Establishing the Guilt of the
Accused, 31 TUL. L. Rlv. 173 (1956).
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Currens, where everyone is .exempt from criminal responsibility.
Professor Hall and others, unfortunately equating symptom forma-
tion with mental illness, quote psychiatrists as saying that "all Ameri-
cans are mentally diseased," and hence, in the event of commission of
crime, acquittal would result under the new-fangled Durham or
Currens tests of criminal responsibility. The recent Mid-Manhattan
Study on Mental Health is quoted as holding that 82% of the resi-
dents are mentally ill.59 But it should be noticed that this study
actually does not attempt to make a nosologic diagnosis (psychotic
disorder, psychoneurotic disorder or personality disorder).00 The
ratings in this study were: well-18.5%; mild symptom formation-
36.3%; moderate symptom formation-21.8%; marked symptom
formation-13.2%; severe symptom formation-7.5%; incapacitated
-2.7%. This survey measures not mental illness but degree of
mental health. The fact that a majority of the population shows
symptom formation (e.g., a headache) does not mean that they are
mentally ill, but that they have not achieved the degree of mental
health that would have desirability. The question of mental illness
arises in the case of persons who show severe symptom formation or
who are incapacitated.
What is the standard of "normality"? Diagnosis is not made
solely, as it is sometimes implied, by the degree of deviation from
social norms.01 Mental health is not an indiscriminate adjustment
through positive acceptance of environmental conditions. Bettel-
heim has described the severe psychic distortions that resulted
from a passive adjustment to and acceptance of the environment in
the concentration camps. A healthy individual does more than
merely adjust to his environment; he makes the environment adapt
to him as well. Freud, when asked what he thought a normal
person should do well, is reported to have said: "Lieben und arbei-
ten" (to love and to work).6 2
Psychoanalysts might say that if one goes "deep enough" in ex-
amining the psyche of an individual, unconscious material laden with
49 Hall, op. cit. supra note 4.
60 See Srole, Langner, Michael, Opler & Rennie, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METROPOLS
(1962).
61 Hall, op. cit. supra note 4.
62 Epstein, Concepts of Normality or Evaluation of Emotional Health, 3 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 335 (1958). See also Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, ExPLoRA.
TIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 138 (1957).
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pathological conflicts will be found. While this may be true, the
crucial factor is the individual's coping mechanisms. In a healthy
individual the positive side is able to cope with the negative side.
A healthy individual is not without conflicts. Rather, he is a person
who is dealing with and has dealt with the conflicts of each stage of
development in life in an esssentially satisfactory manner.63
One might say, in popular language, that all criminals have
"something wrong with them." The "normal" criminal is indeed
rare-the normal, or situational, criminal refers to persons who com-
mit criminal acts only as a last resort in a situation which realistically,
to them, offers no other solution. This would refer to the man
who steals to prevent his children from becoming malnourished when
he has been honestly unable to find a job, and no charity is available.
Most offenders, however, are driven by emotional conflict and un-
consciousness motivation, not by temporary overwhelming need. An
individual who kills or rapes is deranged or is without feelings.
This is not to imply, however, that ipso facto he should be acquitted
or sent to a hospital.
Society must protect itself from the dangerous individual,
whether his acts are free-willed or determined. Free will or sick-
ness, or whatever one chooses to call it, is not an excuse to roam the
streets and abuse others. Protection, however, does not come via
McNaghten or by the other rules of criminal responsibility.
Regardless of its cause or meaning, criminal behavior by defini-
tion is harmful to society, and the offender must be isolated from
society as long as he is likely to behave in the same destructive man-
ner. Whatever treatment is performed must be carried out in a
correctional institution until there is reason to believe that he will
relate to the demands of society in a more constructive manner.
Criminological research over the past several decades has brought
one point home time and time again. Rehabilitation of the criminal
63 See ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950).
Emotional health involves the following: absence of psychiatric structured symptoms,
social and occupational adaptation and dynamic integration with the presence of only
mild anxiety. In greater detail this does not imply that the individual does not
have conflicts and problems, but that he is able to deal with such problems and
conflicts in a manner which is satisfactory for himself and those around him, in-
cluding the larger society. Emotionally healthy individuals are those who are able
to achieve an optimal utilization of their innate endowment. Letter from Dr. N. B.
Epstein, Chief Psychiatrist, Jewish General Hospital, Montreal, Canada, to author,
Oct. 10, 1962.
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is usually impractical idealism, due both to his personality structure
and the inadequacy of present-day treatment facilities and method.
Freud maintained that early adolescence offers the last chance
for modification of personality, and that thereafter its alteration in
any radical way is a task of the utmost difficulty.64 It is what goes on
between the child and his parents during the first two, perhaps five
years, that has the profoundest shaping-not the only, but the pro-
foundest shaping-of the individual for good or ill, the pattern
of which underlies all later development.6 5 Freud's discoveries have
given birth to the child guidance and playgrounds movement, since
it has come to be appreciated that prevention is better than cure.
It may now sound trite, but it is true: delinquency is best controlled
by providing children with a home environment free of emotional
stress and personal insecurity. By so educating the public, psychiatry
is aiding the criminal law process by trying to keep people out of it.
This is not subversion.
14 Ecologists have pointed out a "critical" time in animal development. At that
time inherent growth pattern of the animal can be changed by exposing it to experi-
ences not consistent with environment in which growth occurs. Thus, a duck separated
from the brood and attended by a human caretaker will not return to the duck
society after that critical period. Similarly, there are critical periods in human
development. See Mahler & Furer, Certain Aspects of the Separation-Individuation
Phase, 32 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 1, 14 (1963). See also ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
(1950); Josselyn, Illegitimacy, SExuAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw (Slovenko ed., in
publication); Blaine, The Children of Divorce, The Atlantic, March 1963, p. 98;
Carstairs, The First Years, 68 THE LISTENER 853 (1962); Halleck, The Criminal's
Problem with Psychiatry, 23 PSYCHIATRY 409 (1960); Rogers & Skinner, Some Issues
Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A Symposium, 124 SCIENCE 1057 (1956);
Scott, Critical Periods in Behavioral Development, 138 SCIENCE 949 (1962).
66 "All psychoanalytic theories agree generally that the beginnings of neurotic
development must be sought in the vicissitudes of childhood growth. They differ in
their emphasis on the particular factors in the child which are involved." Rubins,
On the Early Development of the Self: Its Role in Neurosis 22 AM. J. oF PsYCHO-
ANALYSIS 122 (1962).
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